Secure Programming: A Way of Life (or Death)

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  - Department of Computer Science
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  - Anyone else you can think of, including my pets

Theme: Does It Matter?

- How important is secure coding?
- If it is so important, why aren't we "priming the pump" seriously?

Weinberg's Second Law

If builders built buildings the way programmers wrote programs . . .

then the first woodpecker to come along would destroy civilization

The Psychology of Computer Programming (1971)

What *Exactly* Are We Talking About?

- Robust programming—prevents abnormal termination, unexpected actions
- Secure programming—satisfies (stated or implicit) security properties
- Example: buffer overflows
  - *Always* non-robust programming
  - May *or may not* be non-secure programming

Robust vs. Secure Programming

Secure programming requires robust programming

You can’t have realistic security without robustness

Problem

- We don't build systems that meet security requirements
- We don't write software that is robust
  - Some exceptions in special cases
- Many different models for developing software
  - Agile, waterfall, rapid prototyping, . . .

Quality of Code

- Underlying all this is *programming*
  - When coding, you make assumptions about services, systems, input, output
  - Other components you rely on have bugs or may act unexpectedly
- Hard to have robust, secure software when the infrastructure isn't

Security is Cumulative

- Composing non-secure modules produces non-secure software
- Can ameliorate this with shims to handle non-secure results
  - Shims provide the security
  - What if they themselves are written, installed, etc. non-securely?
  - What if they can be bypassed?

More Problems

- Refactor code, use external libraries, modules, services
  - *You inherit their bugs and assumptions!*
- Example: RSAREF2 library buffer overflow (1999)
  - Affected *ssh*, anything using that library
- Move code into different environment, assumptions may not hold

Basic Principles of Robustness

- Paranoia
- Assume maximum stupidity
- Don’t hand out dangerous implements
- “Can’t happen” means it can

Helping Solve the Technical Problem

- Isolate assumptions, make them explicit
  - Not just your code, but also about what your code calls
  - Allows you to build (informal) preconditions, postconditions for others to use
- Make them part of the documentation (or comments)
- Identify those relating to security explicitly
  - Good judgment needed here

Test to These!

- Make sure your assumptions hold in the environment(s) you intend the software to be used
  - If you state them explicitly, users can check them
  - Think *autoconf* to check these on installation
  - Warn if not met!

What Will Drive Improvement?

- Commercial incentives
  - Financial savings from not cleaning up so many messes
  - Maintenance simpler
  - Better reputation (of products, company)
  - Easier to bring new programmers, software engineers up to speed on products
  - Issues of software liability

What Will Drive Improvement?

- Government incentives
  - Financial savings from not cleaning up so many messes
  - Maintenance simple
  - Better defenses for national security

Software Liability

- You can't say "I'm not responsible for anything"
  - Chain of distribution (ie, supply chain) liability exists now
- You can limit liability somewhat by defining use, environment
  - Then you're liable in that context but (probably) not in others
- It *is* coming . . .
  - EULAs may not be enforceable ("contracts of adhesion")

Software Liability

- ***Don't dump it on the programmers!!!!***
  - Non-programming considerations impact quality of programs
  - More about this in a bit ...

So What's Holding Us Back?

- Commercial
  - No legal liability for bad software
  - More expensive to make; longer time to market
  - Lack of people who write robust code
- Government
  - Need to spend more money to get it
  - Need to pay more attention to installation, maintenance, use
  - Need to recruit people who can use it well

So What's Holding Us Back?

- Academic
  - Robust coding not seen as integral to programming
    - Textbooks *loaded* with examples of non-robust programming
  - Lack of support for *enforcing* and *grading* for it in non-introductory classes
    - Ties into lack of graders who really know about this
  - Lack of faculty who understand robust programming
    - And intimidation factor for those who *know* they don't understand it

Lack of Resources

- Assurance costs!
  - Industry expected to deliver secure, robust products without offset for the extra effort in delivering them
  - Academia expected to teach *and reinforce* robust programming without offset for the extra effort in supporting this

Lack of People

- Need to teach people how to write robust programming
  - Need to emphasize this in the *practice*, supporting it both in education *and* industry
- Continuous practice is *central* to reinforcing, maintaining, extending skills

Focus for Rest of Talk

- How can industry and government work with academic institutions to do this?
  - Carrots, not sticks
  - Security tuned to environment, use
  - What is “secure” varies among companies and government organizations
- ***Everyone*** lacks resources!!!

How Do We Teach Secure Programming?

- SESS report has suggestions
  - http://nob.cs.ucdavis.edu/~bishop/notes/2011-sess/2011-sess.pdf
- Key conclusion: *no one sector can improve the state of the practice on its own*
  - "We must all hang together, or we shall all hang separately" (B. Franklin)

Questionable Idea #1: Testing Students' Knowledge

- Who creates the tests?
- Who is being tested?
- How do you know that you are testing what is important (that is, the "right thing")?
- Who determines what is an acceptable result?
- Teaching for the test, not the material

Questionable Idea #2: Unsupported Mandates

- The support has to come from somewhere
  - It's like a zero-sum game
- What do you want to weaken?
  - If you only have so many resources, something will have to give
  - You don't want to weaken the core foundation of understanding *why* certain programming paradigms are critical

What Can Academia Do?

- Include robustness in evaluation of programs, programming projects
- Create a "secure programming clinic"
  - Like an English clinic, or a writing clinic for law schools
  - Evaluation project being funded by NSF
- Provide supplementary material for textbooks, classes
  - These should emphasize robust programming

What Can Industry Do?

- Key is to do more than *say* it is important
- Make clear that the skills are important for hiring
  - Mention their need in job openings
  - Preference to those with skill in this also helps

Work With Students and Faculty

- Internships
  - Students *love* these; good recruiting tool
  - Tasks requiring robust programming emphasize its importance to students
- Help teach students
  - Review students' code
  - Team with colleges in senior/capstone projects

What Will This Do?

- Increase student demand
  - If students see it as important, they will ask about it in class, evaluate programs, faculty in part on it
- Increase your visibility
  - Good recruiting tools
  - A corporate "good citizen"

Government Support

- Act like an industry (see above)
- Government can also fund programs
- *Imperative: target funding towards this specific purpose*
  - That will <u>require</u> funding to be used for supporting robust programming
  - If done as adjunct, it is likely to disappear in the main purpose of the funding

NSA (NSA/DHS) CAE Program

- Begun in 1997 with 7 universities
- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration does oversight
- Academia funded via IASP (scholarships) and Capacity Building grants
- Program has very limited funding

NSF Education and Human Resources

- Scholarships for Service supports graduate students
- Capacity building funds to improve state of education in computer security
  - Secure programming projects funded here are prototypes
  - Focus on tool development, building awareness
  - Funding not large

NSF Funding Sources

- Program funded in the Commerce/Justice/ Science appropriations bill
- Could add extra funding targeted to secure programming projects specifically
- Focus for NSF alone should be on experimental projects to learn what works, what doesn't, and under what conditions

Critical Warning About NSF

Augment NSF's budget to cover this

Otherwise, the state of computer security (and other research) will degrade, impairing our nation's strengths in science and technology as well as other areas

National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education

- Originally run by Dept. of Education and NSF
- Now run by NIST
- Mission: to bolster formal cybersecurity education programs encompassing kindergarten through 12th grade, higher education, and vocational programs

More About NICE

- Goal 3 includes developing a cybersecurity capable workforce
  - Analogy between teaching cybersecurity and subjects like reading, writing, science, mathematics
- Analogy with writing good English seems appropriate
- Seems to be a natural program to drive this

Key Points

- Build on existing programs
- Understand that academia is a different environment—completely
  - Business models don't work well because the "end product" is intangible and very long-term

A Really, Really Important Point!

- Academic institutions are rarely governed hierarchically
  - Example: UC has an administration *and* an Academic Senate
  - The Senate, not the administration, has responsibility for the curriculum

Effect: no-one can order faculty to teach something in a particular way

Conclusion

- The state of practice can, and must, change
- Teaching robust programming, *and nothing more*, will not help
- The marketplace must also change, as must current practice
- The public will be the main driver
  - Unfortunately, probably through lawsuits . . .