



Software Security and the BSIMM



Gary McGraw, Ph.D.
Chief Technology Officer

Providing software security professional services since 1992

World's premiere software security consulting firm

- ❑ 250 professional consultants
- ❑ Washington, NY, Silicon Valley, Bloomington, Boston, Amsterdam, London, Chicago, Atlanta

Recognized experts in software security

- ❑ Widely published in books, white papers, and articles
- ❑ Industry thought leaders



Pop quiz

What do wireless devices, cell phones, PDAs, browsers, operating systems, servers, routers, personal computers, cloud computing, public key infrastructure systems, and firewalls have in common?

Software





igital




Advocacy

Error 163: ?Type mismatch –or- We’ re really sorry

Software is broken (not just Web apps)


- ❑ stuxnet
- ❑ firesheep
- ❑ <botnet>
- ❑ zeus
- ❑ nimda




More code, more bugs




Software Vulnerabilities



Windows Complexity



Drivers



The rise of the software security group (SSG)



- ❑ Digital SSG turned sixteen in 2013
- ❑ Microsoft adopts the Secure Development Lifecycle
- ❑ Most firms have a group devoted to software security

- | | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| ▪ microsoft | ▪ cisco | ▪ visa europe |
| ▪ dtcc | ▪ bank of america | ▪ thomson/reuters |
| ▪ emc | ▪ walmart | ▪ BP |
| ▪ fidelity | ▪ finra | ▪ SAP |
| ▪ adobe | ▪ vanguard | ▪ nokia |
| ▪ wells fargo | ▪ college board | ▪ ebay |
| ▪ goldman sachs | ▪ oracle | ▪ mckesson |
| ▪ google | ▪ state street | ▪ ABN/amro |
| ▪ qualcomm | ▪ omgeo | ▪ ING |
| ▪ morgan stanley | ▪ motorola | ▪ telecom italia |
| ▪ usaf | ▪ general electric | ▪ swift |
| ▪ dell | ▪ lockheed martin | ▪ standard life |
| ▪ pershing | ▪ intuit | ▪ cigna |
| ▪ the hartford | ▪ vmware | ▪ AON |
| ▪ barclays capital | ▪ amex | ▪ coke |
| ▪ bank of tokyo | ▪ bank of ny mellon | ▪ mastercard |
| ▪ ups | ▪ harris bank | ▪ apple |
| ▪ bank of montreal | ▪ paypal | ▪ AOL |
| ▪ sterling commerce | ▪ symantec | ▪ CA |
| ▪ time warner | | |



2006: a shift from philosophy to HOW TO

- ❑ Integrating best practices into large organizations' SDLC (that is, an SSDL)
 - ❑ Microsoft's SDL
 - ❑ Cigital's Touchpoints
 - ❑ OWASP CLASP



BSIMM: Software Security Measurement



- ❑ Real data from (62) real initiatives
- ❑ 122 measurements
- ❑ 18 (21) over time
- ❑ McGraw, Miguez, & West






Software security touchpoints

badness-ometer != security meter




badness-ometer

Software security touchpoints



Touchpoint: Code review (with a tool)




- ❑ Code scanning catches on
 - ❑ Demand for manual services up
 - ❑ Tool adoption proceeding apace (being measured)
- ❑ Tools (finally) handle large code bases
 - ❑ Don't fail to grep()
 - ❑ Simple enforcement is no longer useful
- ❑ Customization pays off royally
 - ❑ Fidelity
- ❑ Training courses about bugs and tools widespread




Touchpoint: Architecture risk analysis

- ❑ More common to find customers with a handle on software architecture
- ❑ Widespread use of common components
 - ❑ Spring
 - ❑ Hibernate
 - ❑ Log4J
 - ❑ OpenSSL
 - ❑ “ripple effect”
- ❑ Design patterns help
- ❑ High-expertise work is still hard to teach
- ❑ Training courses about ARA being widely adopted



Touchpoint: Penetration testing

- ❑ Penetration testing finds its place
 - ❑ Badnessometer (helpful for booting program)
 - ❑ Solutions more important than finding problems
- ❑ Focus on final software environment
 - ❑ Configuration
 - ❑ Context
- ❑ Clients no longer rely on pen tests exclusively



Fix the dang software

- ❑ Software security and application security today are about finding bugs
- ❑ The time has come to stop looking for new bugs to add to the list
- ❑ Which bugs in this pile should I fix?





The BSIMM

BSIMM: Software Security Measurement



- ❑ Real data from (62) real initiatives
- ❑ 122 measurements
- ❑ 18 (21) over time
- ❑ McGraw, Miguez, & West



51 firms in the BSIMM community



Adobe



F-Secure



Bank of America

Intel




JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.



Nokia Siemens Networks



The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation



Plus 17 firms that remain anonymous

Monkeys eat bananas



- ❑ BSIMM is not about good or bad ways to eat bananas or banana best practices
- ❑ BSIMM is about observations
- ❑ BSIMM is descriptive, not prescriptive
- ❑ BSIMM describes and measures multiple prescriptive approaches

A software security framework

The Software Security Framework (SSF)			
Governance	Intelligence	SSDL Touchpoints	Deployment
Strategy and Metrics	Attack Models	Architecture Analysis	Penetration Testing
Compliance and Policy	Security Features and Design	Code Review	Software Environment
Training	Standards and Requirements	Security Testing	Configuration Management and Vulnerability Management

- ❑ Four domains
- ❑ Twelve practices
- ❑ See informIT article on BSIMM website <http://bsimm.com>

Architecture Analysis practice skeleton

SSDL TOUCHPOINTS: ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS

Capturing software architecture diagrams, applying lists of risks and threats, adopting a process for review, building an assessment and remediation plan.

Objective	Activity	Level
[AA1.1] get started with AA	perform security feature review	1
[AA1.2] demonstrate value of AA with real data	perform design review for high-risk applications	
[AA1.3] build internal capability on security architecture	have SSG lead review efforts	
[AA1.4] have a lightweight approach to risk classification and prioritization	use risk questionnaire to rank apps	
[AA2.1] model objects	define/use AA process	2
[AA2.2] promote a common language for describing architecture	standardize architectural descriptions (include data flow)	
[AA2.3] build capability organization-wide	make SSG available as AA resource/mentor	
[AA3.1] build capabilities organization-wide	have software architects lead review efforts	3
[AA3.2] build proactive security architecture	drive analysis results into standard architectural patterns (T: sec features/design)	

Example activity

[AA1.2] Perform design review for high-risk applications. The organization learns about the benefits of architecture analysis by seeing real results for a few high-risk, high-profile applications. If the software security group (SSG) is not yet equipped to perform an in-depth architecture analysis, it uses consultants to do this work. Ad hoc review paradigms that rely heavily on expertise may be used here, though in the long run they do not scale.

Real-world Data (62 firms)

❑ Initiative age

- ❑ Average: 5.8 years
- ❑ Newest: 0.1
- ❑ Oldest: 17.4
- ❑ Median: 5.4

❑ SSG size

- ❑ Average: 17.6
- ❑ Smallest: 1
- ❑ Largest: 100
- ❑ Median: 7.5

❑ Satellite size

- ❑ Average: 35.9
- ❑ Smallest: 0
- ❑ Largest: 350
- ❑ Median: 6

❑ Dev size

- ❑ Average: 4097
- ❑ Smallest: 11
- ❑ Largest: 30,000
- ❑ Median: 1400

Average SSG size: 1.75% of dev group size

BSIMM by the Numbers


	BSIMM1	BSIMM2	BSIMM3	BSIMM4	BSIMM4+
Firms	9	30	42	51	61
Measurements	9	49	81	95	122
2nd Measurements	0	0	11	13	15
3rd Measurements	0	0	0	1	1
SSG Members	370	635	786	978	1053
Satellite Members	710	1150	1750	2039	2152
Developers	67,950	141,175	185,316	218,286	241,766
Applications	3970	28,243	41,157	58,739	68,572
Avg SSG Age	5.32	4.49	4.32	4.13	4.0
SSG Avg of Avgs	1.13 / 100	1.02 / 100	1.99 / 100	1.95 / 100	1.75 / 100
Financials	4	12	17	19	23
ISVs	4	7	15	19	23
High Tech	2	7	10	13	15

BSIMM4+ Scorecard

Governance		Intelligence		SSDL Touchpoints		Deployment	
Activity	Observed	Activity	Observed	Activity	Observed	Activity	Observed
[SM1.1]	39	[AM1.1]	19	[AA1.1]	47	[PT1.1]	53
[SM1.2]	32	[AM1.2]	37	[AA1.2]	36	[PT1.2]	44
[SM1.3]	35	[AM1.3]	28	[AA1.3]	29	[PT1.3]	41
[SM1.4]	50	[AM1.4]	14	[AA1.4]	37	[PT2.2]	22
[SM1.6]	37	[AM1.5]	38	[AA2.1]	9	[PT2.3]	26
[SM2.1]	21	[AM1.6]	17	[AA2.2]	7	[PT3.1]	11
[SM2.2]	27	[AM2.1]	12	[AA2.3]	18	[PT3.2]	10
[SM2.3]	29	[AM2.2]	13	[AA3.1]	9		
[SM2.5]	21	[AM3.1]	3	[AA3.2]	4		
[SM3.1]	15	[AM3.2]	5				
[SM3.2]	7						
[CP1.1]	43	[SFD1.1]	49	[CR1.1]	24	[SE1.1]	26
[CP1.2]	49	[SFD1.2]	43	[CR1.2]	24	[SE1.2]	53
[CP1.3]	39	[SFD2.1]	27	[CR1.4]	38	[SE2.2]	26
[CP2.1]	23	[SFD2.2]	21	[CR1.5]	23	[SE2.4]	25
[CP2.2]	30	[SFD2.3]	15	[CR1.6]	22	[SE3.2]	12
[CP2.3]	28	[SFD3.1]	10	[CR2.2]	13	[SE3.3]	7
[CP2.4]	21	[SFD3.2]	11	[CR2.5]	11		
[CP2.5]	36			[CR3.1]	13		
[CP3.1]	9			[CR3.2]	3		
[CP3.2]	13			[CR3.3]	6		
[CP3.3]	8			[CR3.4]	1		
[T1.1]	42	[SR1.1]	43	[ST1.1]	43	[CMVM1.1]	48
[T1.5]	21	[SR1.2]	31	[ST1.3]	44	[CMVM1.2]	52
[T1.6]	22	[SR1.3]	39	[ST2.1]	24	[CMVM2.1]	44
[T1.7]	26	[SR1.4]	24	[ST2.3]	8	[CMVM2.2]	38
[T2.5]	11	[SR2.1]	12	[ST2.4]	13	[CMVM2.3]	26
[T2.6]	13	[SR2.2]	21	[ST3.1]	11	[CMVM3.1]	4
[T2.7]	11	[SR2.3]	19	[ST3.2]	11	[CMVM3.2]	6
[T3.1]	5	[SR2.4]	20	[ST3.3]	5	[CMVM3.3]	0
[T3.2]	5	[SR2.5]	20	[ST3.4]	6		
[T3.3]	9	[SR3.1]	8				
[T3.4]	6						
[T3.5]	6						

BSIMM4 as a Measuring Stick

- ❑ Compare a firm with peers using the high water mark view
- ❑ Compare business units
- ❑ Chart an SSI over time



BSIMM₄ scorecard with FAKE firm data

BSIMM4 Scorecard for: FIRM						Raw Score: 41					
Governance			Intelligence			SSDL Touchpoints			Deployment		
Activity	BSIMM Firms	FIRM	Activity	BSIMM Firms	FIRM	Activity	BSIMM Firms	FIRM	Activity	BSIMM Firms	FIRM
[SM1.1]	35	1	[AM1.1]	15	1	[AA1.1]	39		[PT1.1]	47	1
[SM1.2]	30		[AM1.2]	31		[AA1.2]	35	1	[PT1.2]	40	1
[SM1.3]	33		[AM1.3]	25		[AA1.3]	27	1	[PT1.3]	35	
[SM1.4]	44	1	[AM1.4]	13	1	[AA1.4]	32		[PT2.2]	20	
[SM1.6]	35		[AM1.5]	32	1	[AA2.1]	10		[PT2.3]	24	1
[SM2.1]	21		[AM1.6]	17	1	[AA2.2]	7		[PT3.1]	11	
[SM2.2]	26		[AM2.1]	12		[AA2.3]	17		[PT3.2]	8	
[SM2.3]	26		[AM2.2]	13		[AA3.1]	9				
[SM2.5]	22	1	[AM3.1]	3		[AA3.2]	4				
[SM3.1]	15	1	[AM3.2]	5							
[SM3.2]	6										
[CP1.1]	40	1	[SFD1.1]	44	1	[CR1.1]	23	1	[SE1.1]	21	1
[CP1.2]	45		[SFD1.2]	37	1	[CR1.2]	20	1	[SE1.2]	47	
[CP1.3]	36	1	[SFD2.1]	25		[CR1.4]	33	1	[SE2.2]	21	
[CP2.1]	21		[SFD2.2]	19		[CR1.5]	22		[SE2.4]	23	
[CP2.2]	28		[SFD2.3]	15	1	[CR1.6]	21		[SE3.2]	11	
[CP2.3]	25		[SFD3.1]	8	1	[CR2.2]	13		[SE3.3]	7	1
[CP2.4]	22		[SFD3.2]	9		[CR2.5]	12				
[CP2.5]	31					[CR3.1]	13	1			
[CP3.1]	7					[CR3.2]	3				
[CP3.2]	12					[CR3.3]	4	1			
[CP3.3]	8					[CR3.4]	TBD				
[T1.1]	38		[SR1.1]	38	1	[ST1.1]	38	1	[CMVM1.1]	40	1
[T1.5]	19	1	[SR1.2]	27		[ST1.3]	37	1	[CMVM1.2]	44	1
[T1.6]	21	1	[SR1.3]	34	1	[ST2.1]	24	1	[CMVM2.1]	37	1
[T1.7]	23		[SR1.4]	21		[ST2.3]	8		[CMVM2.2]	31	
[T2.5]	10		[SR2.1]	12	1	[ST2.4]	12		[CMVM2.3]	23	1
[T2.6]	12	1	[SR2.2]	20		[ST3.1]	9		[CMVM3.1]	5	
[T2.7]	11		[SR2.3]	18		[ST3.2]	11		[CMVM3.2]	6	
[T3.1]	5	1	[SR2.4]	19		[ST3.3]	5		[CMVM3.3]	TBD	
[T3.2]	5		[SR2.5]	21	1	[ST3.4]	6				
[T3.3]	8		[SR3.1]	8							
[T3.4]	6										
[T3.5]	6										

Legend: Activity 111 BSIMM4 activities, shown in 4 domains and 12 practices
 BSIMM Firms count of firms (out of 51) observed performing each activity
 the most common activity within a practice
 a most common activity not observed in this assessment
 a most common activity observed in this assessment
 a practice where the firm's high-water mark score is below the average of the 51 firms

- Top 12 activities
 - purple = good?
 - red = bad?

- “Blue shift” practices to emphasize

BSIMM₄ to BSIMM-V

- ❑ BSIMM₄ released September 2012 under creative commons
 - ❑ <http://bsimm.com>
 - ❑ Italian and German translations available, Spanish soon
- ❑ BSIMM is a yardstick
 - ❑ Use it to see where you stand
 - ❑ Use it to figure out what your peers do
- ❑ BSIMM₄ → BSIMM-V
 - ❑ BSIMM is growing
 - ❑ Target of 75 firms





Where to learn more

SearchSecurity + Justice League



www.searchsecurity.com

No-nonsense monthly security column by Gary McGraw

www.cigital.com/~gem/writing

www.cigital.com/justiceleague

In-depth thought leadership blog from the Cigital Principals

- ❑ Scott Matsumoto
- ❑ Gary McGraw
- ❑ Sammy Migues
- ❑ John Steven
- ❑ Paco Hope



silver bullet + IEEE security & privacy




www.cigital.com/silverbullet

Building Security In
Software Security Best Practices
column

www.computer.org/security/bsisub/



The book



How to DO software security

- ❑ Best practices
- ❑ Tools
- ❑ Knowledge

Cornerstone of the Addison-Wesley Software Security Series

www.swsec.com




Addison
Wesley

Build security in




cigital

<http://bsimm.com>

**WE NEED GREAT
PEOPLE**

Read the Addison-Wesley
Software Security series

Send e-mail: gem@cigital.com



Addison
Wesley